History of the 502nd PIR during WWII
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Activation and Training
Airborne History
The United States Military had been toying with the idea of paratroopers since WWI, and was scheduled to start testing and adapting infantry soldiers until the end of the Great War signaled a reduction in troop levels and military needs. It wasn't until Russia and Germany starting using mass drops of paratroopers in the late 1930’s that serious discussions restarted. The German invasion of Crete proved that the use of airborne troops could seize key objectives, bridges or even a fortress quickly and provided a shock element to an army and mass confusion to an enemy. A test platoon was formed in 1940 and began experimenting with various equipment and parachute types. This test platoon was formed as a volunteer only battalion and to generate more interest, enlisted men would get an additional $50 of jump pay per month and commissioned officers would get $100 extra.
Activation
On July 1st 1941, the 502nd Parachute Battalion was officially formed at Ft. Benning, GA. This new parachute Battalion was an expansion of the 501st Parachute Battalion and brought many officers to the 502nd, which would later help write, develop and define US Airborne doctrine. While the Airborne concept was still in its infancy, the events at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941 pushed all branches of the military to rapidly expand, especially this new specialized infantry. In response, the 502nd was expanded from a Battalion into a Regiment on March 2, 1942 and was placed under the command of Lt. Col. George P. Howell. Shortly after formation Col. Howell was appointed to take command of the parachute school at Ft. Bragg. Command was then placed to Lt. Col George Van Horn Moseley Jr., a decision that helped to define the term espri de corp of “Airborne” for years to come. A former West Pointer, Lt. Col Moseley, brought his untiring work ethic and will power to his new troopers. He made enormous demands on his men, as well as himself, a trait that helped shape his men into fearless fighters.
The United States Military had been toying with the idea of paratroopers since WWI, and was scheduled to start testing and adapting infantry soldiers until the end of the Great War signaled a reduction in troop levels and military needs. It wasn't until Russia and Germany starting using mass drops of paratroopers in the late 1930’s that serious discussions restarted. The German invasion of Crete proved that the use of airborne troops could seize key objectives, bridges or even a fortress quickly and provided a shock element to an army and mass confusion to an enemy. A test platoon was formed in 1940 and began experimenting with various equipment and parachute types. This test platoon was formed as a volunteer only battalion and to generate more interest, enlisted men would get an additional $50 of jump pay per month and commissioned officers would get $100 extra.
Activation
On July 1st 1941, the 502nd Parachute Battalion was officially formed at Ft. Benning, GA. This new parachute Battalion was an expansion of the 501st Parachute Battalion and brought many officers to the 502nd, which would later help write, develop and define US Airborne doctrine. While the Airborne concept was still in its infancy, the events at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941 pushed all branches of the military to rapidly expand, especially this new specialized infantry. In response, the 502nd was expanded from a Battalion into a Regiment on March 2, 1942 and was placed under the command of Lt. Col. George P. Howell. Shortly after formation Col. Howell was appointed to take command of the parachute school at Ft. Bragg. Command was then placed to Lt. Col George Van Horn Moseley Jr., a decision that helped to define the term espri de corp of “Airborne” for years to come. A former West Pointer, Lt. Col Moseley, brought his untiring work ethic and will power to his new troopers. He made enormous demands on his men, as well as himself, a trait that helped shape his men into fearless fighters.
Above: A picture of “I” Company 502nd PIR at Ft. Bragg 1943
In July of 1942, 2 full Airborne divisions, the 82nd and the 101st, were activated at Le Claiborne, LA. The 502nd was assigned to the 101st and became its original Regiment causing the 502nd to be moved from Ft. Benning to Ft. Bragg where the 101st Airborne was headquartered. The training programs ramped up from 1942 to 1943 and increased in shape and scope and were designed to push the troopers to their limits and beyond. The 502nd took part in Division maneuvers at Southern Pines and Camden, and continued to prove their toughness when Company H set a new marching record by marching a total of 145.5 miles in 57.25 hours, in which the first 33 miles were done in 11 hours.
In July of 1942, 2 full Airborne divisions, the 82nd and the 101st, were activated at Le Claiborne, LA. The 502nd was assigned to the 101st and became its original Regiment causing the 502nd to be moved from Ft. Benning to Ft. Bragg where the 101st Airborne was headquartered. The training programs ramped up from 1942 to 1943 and increased in shape and scope and were designed to push the troopers to their limits and beyond. The 502nd took part in Division maneuvers at Southern Pines and Camden, and continued to prove their toughness when Company H set a new marching record by marching a total of 145.5 miles in 57.25 hours, in which the first 33 miles were done in 11 hours.
Training
Airborne training consisted primarily of thousands of push-ups, long distance runs, speed hikes covering extreme distances in short times, obstacle courses and whatever diabolical ideas could be hatched by their commanding officers. All movements were done at double time and no walking was allowed outside of the buildings. Friday nights had cross country field problems until 0200 or road marches that ranged between 10-20 miles, until 0200. Saturday nights and Sundays were OFF days, which hopefully including a leave pass do go out on the town. During heavy rain marches and the obstacle courses were not ran, opting instead to drill indoors. Lecture and classroom instruction would include knife fighting, self-defense judo, bayonet drill, as well as the usual VD classes, military courtesy, tactics, etc.
Airborne training consisted primarily of thousands of push-ups, long distance runs, speed hikes covering extreme distances in short times, obstacle courses and whatever diabolical ideas could be hatched by their commanding officers. All movements were done at double time and no walking was allowed outside of the buildings. Friday nights had cross country field problems until 0200 or road marches that ranged between 10-20 miles, until 0200. Saturday nights and Sundays were OFF days, which hopefully including a leave pass do go out on the town. During heavy rain marches and the obstacle courses were not ran, opting instead to drill indoors. Lecture and classroom instruction would include knife fighting, self-defense judo, bayonet drill, as well as the usual VD classes, military courtesy, tactics, etc.
Typical Day during Airborne Training
0600 Reveille
0610 formation, police call 0630 Shave, tidy barracks 0700 Calisthenics…Intense to the point of exhaustion 0800 Wash up 0900 Barracks Inspection 0930 Long distance run or obstacle course 1045 PT drills (ropes, log carry/lift, etc) 1115 Outside lecture |
1200 lunch
1330 Mail Call 1345 Lecture/Classroom 1500 Parachute training (tower, PLFs, etc) 1700 Drill 1800 Supper 1900 Lecture/Classroom 2100 Return to barracks (cleaning, letters) 2300 TAPS |
Obstacle Course Elements
Ill Fated Trip
On September 4th, 1943, the 502nd is boarded onto the SS Strathnaver to attempt the crossing to England. Unfortunately, the trip would 6 weeks and include a stop in St. Johns Newfoundland which delayed the Units arrival in England for a month. After 6 days at sea it was discovered that the Strathnaver had fresh water in its saltwater tanks and was forced to port. On the 26th of September, the men of the five-oh-deuce once again departed, only to have the ship strike rocks in the harbor, take on water and yet again be forced back to port. On October 4th, the Regiment was boarded onto the SS John Ericson for the 2-week trek across the Atlantic. Although the crossing took longer than expected, the brass of the 502nd used the time effectively and conducted foot marches, inspections and physical conditioning. Finally, on October 18th, the 502nd PIR finally arrived at Liverpool and transported to their new quarters.
On September 4th, 1943, the 502nd is boarded onto the SS Strathnaver to attempt the crossing to England. Unfortunately, the trip would 6 weeks and include a stop in St. Johns Newfoundland which delayed the Units arrival in England for a month. After 6 days at sea it was discovered that the Strathnaver had fresh water in its saltwater tanks and was forced to port. On the 26th of September, the men of the five-oh-deuce once again departed, only to have the ship strike rocks in the harbor, take on water and yet again be forced back to port. On October 4th, the Regiment was boarded onto the SS John Ericson for the 2-week trek across the Atlantic. Although the crossing took longer than expected, the brass of the 502nd used the time effectively and conducted foot marches, inspections and physical conditioning. Finally, on October 18th, the 502nd PIR finally arrived at Liverpool and transported to their new quarters.
England
Setting up camp in England, the 502nd was assigned to quarters in Chilton Foliat and Denford area near Hungerford, Berkshire (approximately 80 miles west of London) and had previously been used by the 509th PIR, 82nd AB before their entry into combat in Africa. They were billeted in a combination of Nissen huts (long corrugated buildings with humped roofs), to barracks for enlisted men, while officers were assigned to stay with local families. Many changes were in store for the men of the five-oh-deuce, including a new diet, due to the extreme rationing the British were under, the constant fog, and the quiet countryside. The men did not get to enjoy their new surroundings very long as once again the training came to dominate the order of the day. The physical conditioning training included 15-25-mile hikes and daily close combat exercises. Instructions were given on a wide variety of items from first aid, map reading, chemical warfare, and the use and firing of German weapons. Numerous practice parachute jumps with simulated missions were conducted and accomplishing objectives at night became routine. These night exercises became a clue that the paratroopers were going into combat at night, now the only question was where and when they would invade Hitler’s fortress Europe. In early spring, the 502nd participated in 3 large scale simulated combat missions that would be their last dress rehearsal before D-Day, they were Exercise Beaver in March, Exercise Tiger in April and Exercise Eagle in May of 1944.
Setting up camp in England, the 502nd was assigned to quarters in Chilton Foliat and Denford area near Hungerford, Berkshire (approximately 80 miles west of London) and had previously been used by the 509th PIR, 82nd AB before their entry into combat in Africa. They were billeted in a combination of Nissen huts (long corrugated buildings with humped roofs), to barracks for enlisted men, while officers were assigned to stay with local families. Many changes were in store for the men of the five-oh-deuce, including a new diet, due to the extreme rationing the British were under, the constant fog, and the quiet countryside. The men did not get to enjoy their new surroundings very long as once again the training came to dominate the order of the day. The physical conditioning training included 15-25-mile hikes and daily close combat exercises. Instructions were given on a wide variety of items from first aid, map reading, chemical warfare, and the use and firing of German weapons. Numerous practice parachute jumps with simulated missions were conducted and accomplishing objectives at night became routine. These night exercises became a clue that the paratroopers were going into combat at night, now the only question was where and when they would invade Hitler’s fortress Europe. In early spring, the 502nd participated in 3 large scale simulated combat missions that would be their last dress rehearsal before D-Day, they were Exercise Beaver in March, Exercise Tiger in April and Exercise Eagle in May of 1944.
D-Day and Normandy
Operation Overlord
In mid-1943 a plan was hatched to combine an invasion by Air, Sea and land along the coast of Normandy.
This Operation combined the forces of 156,115 U.S., British and Canadian troops, 6,939 ships and landing vessels, and 2,395 aircraft and 867 gliders that delivered airborne troops and would be the largest amphibious invasion and the largest Airborne invasion up to that point in the War.
Since Operation Overlord was launched from England, the U.S. military had to ship 7 million tons of supplies to the staging area, including 450,000 tons of ammunition through German Sub invested waters. Its goal was to establish a beachhead on which a harbor could be built to open entry into Europe. US, British and Canadian forces would land by sea on beaches code named "Utah", "Omaha", "Gold", "Juno", and "Sword".
This Operation combined the forces of 156,115 U.S., British and Canadian troops, 6,939 ships and landing vessels, and 2,395 aircraft and 867 gliders that delivered airborne troops and would be the largest amphibious invasion and the largest Airborne invasion up to that point in the War.
Since Operation Overlord was launched from England, the U.S. military had to ship 7 million tons of supplies to the staging area, including 450,000 tons of ammunition through German Sub invested waters. Its goal was to establish a beachhead on which a harbor could be built to open entry into Europe. US, British and Canadian forces would land by sea on beaches code named "Utah", "Omaha", "Gold", "Juno", and "Sword".
The Airborne Plan
To protect the Right flank of the invasion force, Allied command planned to drop the 82nd and the 101st Airborne behind enemy lines. This Airborne attack would occur in the early morning hours before the invasion would start and attempt to capture exit causeways off of the beach, necessary bridges for the invasion force and severe communication to confuse the German forces and knock out gun emplacements that could fire upon the beach landings.
D-Day Planning
502nd PIR Objectives on D-Day
1. 502nd was assigned to be dropped onto Drop Zone “A” and depart from Membury and Greenham Commons airfields in the first wave.
2. Destruction of the four-gun coastal battery at St. Martin-De-Varreville.
a. Assigned to Lt. Colonel Steve Chappuis 2nd Battalion, with reserve force assigned to Lt. Colonel Robert Cole’s 3rd Battalion
b. Fox Company had won a regimental competition and was given special assault training to spearhead the attack on the battery
3. The capture of “WXYZ” – the artillery personnel’s barracks complex of the Germans at Mesieres.
a. Assigned to Lt. Colonel Cassidy’s 1st Battalion
4. The setting up of strong roadblocks to the north near Foucarville to prevent German reinforcements from moving to the beach area.
a. Assigned to Lt. Colonel Patrick Cassidy’s 1st Battalion
5. The seizure of upper causeways (exits 3 and 4) to enable the 4th Infantry Division to move inland toward Cherbourg
a. Assigned to Lt. Colonel Robert Cole’s 3rd Battalion
502nd PIR Objectives on D-Day
1. 502nd was assigned to be dropped onto Drop Zone “A” and depart from Membury and Greenham Commons airfields in the first wave.
2. Destruction of the four-gun coastal battery at St. Martin-De-Varreville.
a. Assigned to Lt. Colonel Steve Chappuis 2nd Battalion, with reserve force assigned to Lt. Colonel Robert Cole’s 3rd Battalion
b. Fox Company had won a regimental competition and was given special assault training to spearhead the attack on the battery
3. The capture of “WXYZ” – the artillery personnel’s barracks complex of the Germans at Mesieres.
a. Assigned to Lt. Colonel Cassidy’s 1st Battalion
4. The setting up of strong roadblocks to the north near Foucarville to prevent German reinforcements from moving to the beach area.
a. Assigned to Lt. Colonel Patrick Cassidy’s 1st Battalion
5. The seizure of upper causeways (exits 3 and 4) to enable the 4th Infantry Division to move inland toward Cherbourg
a. Assigned to Lt. Colonel Robert Cole’s 3rd Battalion
D-Day for the 502nd and Adventures in France
The night of June 5th, 1944, the 6.670 paratroopers of the 101st Airborne along with their brothers in the 82nd Airborne took off for their jump into darkness in occupied France. After an approximate flight time of 1 hour and 30 minutes, the green went on at approximately 0100 on June 6th and the troopers start to exit the aircraft. Due to a combination of low clouds and heavy ground fire from machine guns and 20mm anti-aircraft guns, only about one-third of the paratroopers are dropped in the correct locations. The rest are horribly scattered from a half mile to more than 15 miles away from their drop zones. Some unlucky paratroopers were drowned after being dropped to late in the English Channel or killed before they could exit the C-47s. During the drop Col. Van Horn Moseley, the 502nd’s commanding officer, broke his leg and had to relinquish command to his executive officer, Lt. Col. John H. Michaelis. The 502nd had the fortune of having their 1st and 3rd Battalions land in the general vicinity of their drop zone, while their 2nd Battalion landed far to the South of their objective near Drop Zone C, as they had honed into the wrong pathfinder signal.
Lt. Col. Robert G. Cole, commander of the 3rd Battalion, had dropped slightly to the East of St. Mere-Eglise and started to assemble the small groups of men and walk their way towards St. Martin-de-Varreville and the 502nd biggest objective, the four-gun battery located there. His group eventually numbered around 75 men and included both 101st and 82nd airborne troopers. They were able to made quick progress towards the coast , only encountering 1 enemy convoy, which they quickly ambushed, killing multiple Germans and taking 10 prisoners. Upon reaching the outskirts of the gun battery, a scouting party was dispatched to determine enemy strength, only to find the gun battery had been decimated by allied bombing and abandoned. This allowed Lt. Col. Cole’s forces to turn their attention to the next objective, the seizure of upper causeways or exits 3 and 4 from Utah beach. Using anything they could find, from fences to deceased animals, Lt. Col. Cole’s forces laid in wait for the enemy. At 0930, the enemy began retreating across the causeways en masse right into the jaws of Cole’s forces and approximately 50 to 75 Germans were cut down. Finally at 1300 hours, the 4th Infantry Division made contact with the 502nd PIR and Lt. Col. Cole’s forced were placed in reserve.
The night of June 5th, 1944, the 6.670 paratroopers of the 101st Airborne along with their brothers in the 82nd Airborne took off for their jump into darkness in occupied France. After an approximate flight time of 1 hour and 30 minutes, the green went on at approximately 0100 on June 6th and the troopers start to exit the aircraft. Due to a combination of low clouds and heavy ground fire from machine guns and 20mm anti-aircraft guns, only about one-third of the paratroopers are dropped in the correct locations. The rest are horribly scattered from a half mile to more than 15 miles away from their drop zones. Some unlucky paratroopers were drowned after being dropped to late in the English Channel or killed before they could exit the C-47s. During the drop Col. Van Horn Moseley, the 502nd’s commanding officer, broke his leg and had to relinquish command to his executive officer, Lt. Col. John H. Michaelis. The 502nd had the fortune of having their 1st and 3rd Battalions land in the general vicinity of their drop zone, while their 2nd Battalion landed far to the South of their objective near Drop Zone C, as they had honed into the wrong pathfinder signal.
Lt. Col. Robert G. Cole, commander of the 3rd Battalion, had dropped slightly to the East of St. Mere-Eglise and started to assemble the small groups of men and walk their way towards St. Martin-de-Varreville and the 502nd biggest objective, the four-gun battery located there. His group eventually numbered around 75 men and included both 101st and 82nd airborne troopers. They were able to made quick progress towards the coast , only encountering 1 enemy convoy, which they quickly ambushed, killing multiple Germans and taking 10 prisoners. Upon reaching the outskirts of the gun battery, a scouting party was dispatched to determine enemy strength, only to find the gun battery had been decimated by allied bombing and abandoned. This allowed Lt. Col. Cole’s forces to turn their attention to the next objective, the seizure of upper causeways or exits 3 and 4 from Utah beach. Using anything they could find, from fences to deceased animals, Lt. Col. Cole’s forces laid in wait for the enemy. At 0930, the enemy began retreating across the causeways en masse right into the jaws of Cole’s forces and approximately 50 to 75 Germans were cut down. Finally at 1300 hours, the 4th Infantry Division made contact with the 502nd PIR and Lt. Col. Cole’s forced were placed in reserve.
Lt. Col. Cassidy, 1st Battalion’s commander, also had a successful drop and landed in the center of the battalion zone near the town of St. Germain-de-Varreville. He quickly gathered a small force of his own and set out towards the barracks for the four-gun battery, known as the WXYZ complex. Securing the crossroads West of where the barracks building stood, Lt. Col. Cassidy’s men linked up with an additional force of 45 men, mostly of the battalion, and ordered them to establish a defensive line at Foucarville, a position directly to their North. After placing the bulk of his men into reserve to protect any additional German reinforcements from gaining access to the beaches from his West, Lt. Col. Cassidy dispatched 15 men to clear the barracks in the WXYZ complex. About 150 Germans were killed or captured after the all of the buildings had been cleared, the bulk of the clearing has been credited to S/Sgt. Harrison Summers, who bull rushed buildings one by one, kicking in doors, spraying his Thompson submachine gun and tossing in grenades. He was assisted by others, but his determination and never ending drive proved to be the difference. Lt. Col. Michaelis and some 200 men arrived near the end of the barracks clearing and linked up with Cassidy’s forces. The skirmish line at Fourcarville had turned successfully into establishing 4 roadblocks in and around the town, trapping and nearly destroying a four vehicle enemy troop convoy.
At the end of June 6th, 1944, all objectives of the 502nd PIR were accomplished, and they are credited to be the only Regiment to have done so. The 502nd PIR was greatly assisted in the fact that the allied bombing had already destroyed the four-gun coastal battery. 2nd Battalion of the 502nd, commanded by Lt. Colonel Steve Chappuis, was not mentioned by name above, but was part of the mixed forces used in accomplishing their objectives. By the end of D-Day the 502nd had the bulk of their force re-assembled and linked up with their Unit.
At the end of June 6th, 1944, all objectives of the 502nd PIR were accomplished, and they are credited to be the only Regiment to have done so. The 502nd PIR was greatly assisted in the fact that the allied bombing had already destroyed the four-gun coastal battery. 2nd Battalion of the 502nd, commanded by Lt. Colonel Steve Chappuis, was not mentioned by name above, but was part of the mixed forces used in accomplishing their objectives. By the end of D-Day the 502nd had the bulk of their force re-assembled and linked up with their Unit.
Purple Heart Lane and the Assault on Carentan
Now that Allied forces has successfully made landings in France and secured a tiny foothold in Europe, they now had to start connecting their beaches, and push further inland. For the Americans it was linking Utah and Omaha beaches. Their first step was the town of St. Come du Mont and would involve the use of 4 battalions; the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 506th PIR, the 3rd Battalion 502st PIR and the 1st Battalion 401st GIR. The attack was launched on the morning of June 8th and by June 10th town was completely encircled and cleared of enemy forces.
The drive now focused on Carentan and along the N13 Highway. The plan called for the 502nd PIR to travel the Carentan Causeway, which was affectionately called Purple Heart lane, take the town and set up a blocking position to the South to prevent any reinforcements or counterattacks. This plan was to be relatively easy because the town was believed to be abandoned due to allied bombing and signs showed the Germans were pulling back, most likely to mount a large counter attack somewhere else. To add to the difficulty the Carentan Causeway was elevated 6 to 9 feet above the marshlands of the Douve River and contained four bridges. The marshlands had also recently been flooded by the German army, forcing any advance to be out in the open. Of the four bridges, one had been partially destroyed by the Germans. Engineers had attempted to make repairs to the bridge, but due to constant small arms fire, they were unable to make any progress, and delayed the start of the attack. On June 10th, the 3rd Battalion 502nd Parachute Infantry stepped off for their attack in the afternoon. Walking single file, the men did the best they could to crouch low or crawl to avoid incoming rounds. Advancement was slow and took 3 hours to cross 3 bridges of the Causeway. Approaching the 4th bridge would prove suicidal, as a Belgian gate had been drawn across the road, forcing the men to squeeze by the obstacle one trooper at a time. They were also now in ranch of machine guns and increased rifle fire from farmhouses and hedgerows. Mortars were called up to help target enemy positions, but still progress was slow. After midnight, the men were bombed and strafed by an enemy fighter, causing several casualties and injuries. Determined to keep going, 3rd Battalion was finally able to get 3 companies through the gauntlet and deploy on either side of the road. Lt. Col. Cole located the center of opposition to a large farmhouse and called for artillery to knock the house down. Unfortunately, continued efforts failed to knock out the house and continued fire on the men increased. Lt. Col. Cole made the decision to launch an all-out offensive towards the farmhouse and ordered the men to fix bayonets. When Cole’s whistle blew, he rushed forward towards the farmhouse. Many troopers didn't immediately hear the whistle or react immediately, leaving Lt. Col. Cole with his .45 M1911 A1 exposed and alone out in front. Upon reaching the farmhouse, the troopers rushed inside, quickly clearing the farmhouse and establishing it as the new command post. The intense fighting continued from the surrounding areas and multiple German counterattacks were launched to regain the lost ground. All failed as 1st Battalion 502nd, was sent to assist and secure 3rd Battalions flanks. This historic day long fight exhausted the 502nd PIR’s men and resources and the 506th PIR was called in for the assault on Carentan the next day. Lt. Col. Cole was cited to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions that day. Sadly, Lt. Col. Robert G. Cole would never wear the medal because he was killed by a snipers bullet 3 months later in Holland. The 506th was able to occupy the city after light resistance, the Germans seeing the fierce determination of the 101st Airborne, had already started to pull back their forces for a counter attack. The counter attack would come on June 13th against the 506th PIR lines and include the 2nd Battalion 502nd and become known as the Battle of Bloody Gulch and Bloody Gully.
Now that Allied forces has successfully made landings in France and secured a tiny foothold in Europe, they now had to start connecting their beaches, and push further inland. For the Americans it was linking Utah and Omaha beaches. Their first step was the town of St. Come du Mont and would involve the use of 4 battalions; the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 506th PIR, the 3rd Battalion 502st PIR and the 1st Battalion 401st GIR. The attack was launched on the morning of June 8th and by June 10th town was completely encircled and cleared of enemy forces.
The drive now focused on Carentan and along the N13 Highway. The plan called for the 502nd PIR to travel the Carentan Causeway, which was affectionately called Purple Heart lane, take the town and set up a blocking position to the South to prevent any reinforcements or counterattacks. This plan was to be relatively easy because the town was believed to be abandoned due to allied bombing and signs showed the Germans were pulling back, most likely to mount a large counter attack somewhere else. To add to the difficulty the Carentan Causeway was elevated 6 to 9 feet above the marshlands of the Douve River and contained four bridges. The marshlands had also recently been flooded by the German army, forcing any advance to be out in the open. Of the four bridges, one had been partially destroyed by the Germans. Engineers had attempted to make repairs to the bridge, but due to constant small arms fire, they were unable to make any progress, and delayed the start of the attack. On June 10th, the 3rd Battalion 502nd Parachute Infantry stepped off for their attack in the afternoon. Walking single file, the men did the best they could to crouch low or crawl to avoid incoming rounds. Advancement was slow and took 3 hours to cross 3 bridges of the Causeway. Approaching the 4th bridge would prove suicidal, as a Belgian gate had been drawn across the road, forcing the men to squeeze by the obstacle one trooper at a time. They were also now in ranch of machine guns and increased rifle fire from farmhouses and hedgerows. Mortars were called up to help target enemy positions, but still progress was slow. After midnight, the men were bombed and strafed by an enemy fighter, causing several casualties and injuries. Determined to keep going, 3rd Battalion was finally able to get 3 companies through the gauntlet and deploy on either side of the road. Lt. Col. Cole located the center of opposition to a large farmhouse and called for artillery to knock the house down. Unfortunately, continued efforts failed to knock out the house and continued fire on the men increased. Lt. Col. Cole made the decision to launch an all-out offensive towards the farmhouse and ordered the men to fix bayonets. When Cole’s whistle blew, he rushed forward towards the farmhouse. Many troopers didn't immediately hear the whistle or react immediately, leaving Lt. Col. Cole with his .45 M1911 A1 exposed and alone out in front. Upon reaching the farmhouse, the troopers rushed inside, quickly clearing the farmhouse and establishing it as the new command post. The intense fighting continued from the surrounding areas and multiple German counterattacks were launched to regain the lost ground. All failed as 1st Battalion 502nd, was sent to assist and secure 3rd Battalions flanks. This historic day long fight exhausted the 502nd PIR’s men and resources and the 506th PIR was called in for the assault on Carentan the next day. Lt. Col. Cole was cited to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions that day. Sadly, Lt. Col. Robert G. Cole would never wear the medal because he was killed by a snipers bullet 3 months later in Holland. The 506th was able to occupy the city after light resistance, the Germans seeing the fierce determination of the 101st Airborne, had already started to pull back their forces for a counter attack. The counter attack would come on June 13th against the 506th PIR lines and include the 2nd Battalion 502nd and become known as the Battle of Bloody Gulch and Bloody Gully.
On 29 June the 101st was relieved from the front lines and sent to Cherbourg to relieve the 4th Infantry Division. The 502nd PIR returned to England shortly after for rest and training and replacements. In August 1944 the First Allied Airborne Army, controlling elements of the American and British (and Polish) Armies was created by General Eisenhower. The 502nd PIR was assigned to the newly created U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps under the command of Gen Matthew Ridgeway and eagerly awaited their next mission
Operation Market Garden
Market Garden
Operation MARKET-GARDEN had two major objectives: to get Allied troops across the Rhine and to capture airborne divisions, to drop in the vicinity of Grave, Nijmegen, and Arnhem to seize bridges over several canals and the Maas, Waal (Rhine), and Neder Rijn Rivers. They were to open a corridor more than fifty miles long leading from Eindhoven northward to Arnhem. Operation GARDEN, called for ground troops of the ninety-nine miles. The main effort of the ground attack was to be made by the British XXX Corps. On either flank the British VIII and XII Corps were to launch supporting attacks.
The 101st Airborne Division was responsible for a 15-mile segment road of narrow concrete and macadam ribbon stretching northward and northeastward from Eindhoven in the direction of Grave. The men of the 101st would soon call that segment of road the nickname Hell’s Highway.
The objectives vital for subsequent passage of the British XXX Corps were located at intervals along the entire 15-mile stretch of road. The division commander, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, later compared the situation to the early American West, where small garrisons had to contend with sudden Indian attacks at any point along great stretches of vital railroad.
Recalling dispersion that had plagued the division in Normandy, General Taylor insisted upon drop zones fairly close together, no matter how scattered the objectives. Two regimental drop zones and the division landing zone were located near the center of the Division sector, west of Hell's Highway in a triangle marked by the villages of Zon, St. Oedenrode, and Best. The 501st PIR, commanded by Col. Howard R. Johnson, would drop to the north of the other regiments near Veghel onto Drop Zone “A” in order to seize rail and road bridges over the Willems Canal and the Aa River. Gen Taylor ordered the 506th PIR, commanded by Col. Robert F. Sink, to drop close to Zon onto Drop Zone “C”, secure the highway bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal a few hundred yards south of Zon, and then march south on Eindhoven. Gen. Taylor tasked the 502nd PIR, commanded by Col. John H. Michaelis, to land just north of the 506th onto Drop Zone “B”, guard both drop zones and secure Landing Zone “W” for gliders, and to capture the road bridge over the Dommel River at St. Oedenrode. Additionally, General Taylor tasked the 502nd to secure bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal south of Best, four miles from Zon off the west flank of Hell's Highway in order to strengthen the over-all position of the 101st. In order to meet Gen. Taylor’s intent, Col. Michaelis sent a company to these bridges.
The 101st Airborne Division was responsible for a 15-mile segment road of narrow concrete and macadam ribbon stretching northward and northeastward from Eindhoven in the direction of Grave. The men of the 101st would soon call that segment of road the nickname Hell’s Highway.
The objectives vital for subsequent passage of the British XXX Corps were located at intervals along the entire 15-mile stretch of road. The division commander, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, later compared the situation to the early American West, where small garrisons had to contend with sudden Indian attacks at any point along great stretches of vital railroad.
Recalling dispersion that had plagued the division in Normandy, General Taylor insisted upon drop zones fairly close together, no matter how scattered the objectives. Two regimental drop zones and the division landing zone were located near the center of the Division sector, west of Hell's Highway in a triangle marked by the villages of Zon, St. Oedenrode, and Best. The 501st PIR, commanded by Col. Howard R. Johnson, would drop to the north of the other regiments near Veghel onto Drop Zone “A” in order to seize rail and road bridges over the Willems Canal and the Aa River. Gen Taylor ordered the 506th PIR, commanded by Col. Robert F. Sink, to drop close to Zon onto Drop Zone “C”, secure the highway bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal a few hundred yards south of Zon, and then march south on Eindhoven. Gen. Taylor tasked the 502nd PIR, commanded by Col. John H. Michaelis, to land just north of the 506th onto Drop Zone “B”, guard both drop zones and secure Landing Zone “W” for gliders, and to capture the road bridge over the Dommel River at St. Oedenrode. Additionally, General Taylor tasked the 502nd to secure bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal south of Best, four miles from Zon off the west flank of Hell's Highway in order to strengthen the over-all position of the 101st. In order to meet Gen. Taylor’s intent, Col. Michaelis sent a company to these bridges.
Beginning three minutes after H-Hour, at 1303, men and equipment began to descend upon the parachute and glider landing zones. Despite flak and small arms fire, only one Pathfinder plane and two of the other parachute aircraft of the 101st Airborne Division failed to reach the drop zones, although some planes went down after the paratroopers had jumped incurring casualties of less than two percent in personnel and five percent in equipment. In an hour and one half 6,769 men were on the ground. Only 1st Battalion, 501st PIR and 1st Battalion, 502nd PIR failed drop on their planned drop zones.
The mission called for the entire 502nd PIR to drop on Drop Zone “B” which was the northernmost of the two drop zones between Zon and St. Oedenrode; 1st Battalion,commanded by Lt. Col. Patrick Cassidy, came down two miles away on the neighboring drop zone. Although delayed by this misadventure, by nightfall had brought a persistent bunch of rear echelon Germans to heel in St. Oedenrode and thereby secured both a main highway and an alternate bridge over the Dommel River. After deploying troopers to defend the village, Lt. Col. Cassidy sent a patrol northeast along Hell's Highway which contacted the 501st Parachute Infantry at Veghel.
The majority of the 502nd moved to an assembly area near Zon as the Division reserve. At the same time a H Company, 3rd Battalion reinforced by a light machine gun section from battalion headquarters and 3rd Platoon, C Company, 326th Engineer Regiment proceeded upon a separate mission, to capture the rail and road bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal southeast of Best. Although these bridges were not assigned objectives for the 101st Airborne Division, General Taylor considered them valuable for three reasons: first, as an outpost protecting his glider landing zone and his main positions along Hell's Highway; again, as alternate crossings of the Wilhelmina Canal should the Germans destroy the bridges at Zon; and again, as control of a mainhighway (between Eindhoven and Hertogenbosch) by which the Germans otherwise might feed reinforcements to Eindhoven. To do the job, Col. Michaelis sent Company H.
The mission called for the entire 502nd PIR to drop on Drop Zone “B” which was the northernmost of the two drop zones between Zon and St. Oedenrode; 1st Battalion,commanded by Lt. Col. Patrick Cassidy, came down two miles away on the neighboring drop zone. Although delayed by this misadventure, by nightfall had brought a persistent bunch of rear echelon Germans to heel in St. Oedenrode and thereby secured both a main highway and an alternate bridge over the Dommel River. After deploying troopers to defend the village, Lt. Col. Cassidy sent a patrol northeast along Hell's Highway which contacted the 501st Parachute Infantry at Veghel.
The majority of the 502nd moved to an assembly area near Zon as the Division reserve. At the same time a H Company, 3rd Battalion reinforced by a light machine gun section from battalion headquarters and 3rd Platoon, C Company, 326th Engineer Regiment proceeded upon a separate mission, to capture the rail and road bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal southeast of Best. Although these bridges were not assigned objectives for the 101st Airborne Division, General Taylor considered them valuable for three reasons: first, as an outpost protecting his glider landing zone and his main positions along Hell's Highway; again, as alternate crossings of the Wilhelmina Canal should the Germans destroy the bridges at Zon; and again, as control of a mainhighway (between Eindhoven and Hertogenbosch) by which the Germans otherwise might feed reinforcements to Eindhoven. To do the job, Col. Michaelis sent Company H.
En route to the bridges, the H Company Commander, Capt. Robert E. Jones, lost his way in the densely wooded Zonsche Forest. Emerging near a road junction southeast of Best, the company came under fire from a small group of Germans. The Germans gained the upper hand when infantry reinforcements and several small cannons arrived by truck from the direction of Hertogenbosch.
Goaded by radio messages from Lt. Col. Cole to secure the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal, Capt. Jones organized a reinforced patrol. Lt. Edward L. Wierzbowski took his rifle platoon, the attached engineer platoon, and attached light machine gun section to the bridges. Lieutenant Wierzbowski found in turn that casualties and disorganization had left him with only eighteen riflemen and twenty-six engineers. Lt. Wierzbowski’s reinforced patrol was picking its way through the Zonsche Forest toward the bridges when night came with a cold, penetrating rain.
Based on stiff resistance north of Best encountered by H Company, Col. Michaelis directed Lt. Col. Robert G. Cole to take his 3rd Battalion to Captain Jones's assistance. The remainder of 3rd Battalion started toward Best at 1800, but darkness fell before they could establish physical contact with Captain Jones.
In the meantime, Lieutenant Wierzbowski and his men had crawled the last few yards on their bellies to reach the Wilhelmina Canal several hundred yards east of the highway bridge. Slithering along the dike, the men approached the bridge, apparently undetected. While the lieutenant and a scout crawled ahead to reconnoiter, the main body of the patrol slid down the embankment to await their return. A barrage of "potato masher" hand grenades came suddenly from the darkness on the other side of the
canal. Scared, a couple of men scrambled up the bank of the dike. Others followed. The night erupted with the fire of machine guns and rifles. Some of the men stampeded back toward the forest.
When he heard the firing, Lt. Wierzbowski was within sight of the bridge and found it covered by German sentries. Scurrying back, he discovered he only had 3 officers and 15 men remaining, and 3 of these were wounded. Collectively they had their individual weapons, a machine gun with 500 rounds of ammunition, a mortar with 6 rounds, and a bazooka with 5 rockets. As the cold rain fell, the men dug in for the night.
As these events developed, the 101st Airborne Division's D-Day glider lift began to arrive. Although not as immune to mishap as the parachutists, a total of 53 out of 70 gliders landed successfully with 32 jeeps, 13 trailers, and 252 men. Of those that failed to make it, 1 fell in the Channel, 1 crash-landed on the landing zone, 2 collided in the air above the landing zone, 2 were unaccounted for, 4 landed in friendly territory, and 7 came down behind enemy lines.
In Zon, the 506th PIR failed to secure the highway bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal before the Germans demolished the bridge. Destruction of the bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal in Zon increased the importance of the 502nd PIR’s mission of securing alternate bridges in Best.
On early D plus 1, 18 September, Col. Michaelis committed 2nd Battalion to the Best fight. The fight for the bridges near Best developed into the 101st Airborne Division's stiffest fighting on D plus 1 and 2.
Behind an artillery barrage that began an hour after the first troop carrier aircraft passed over the British lines, the XXX Corps had attacked on schedule with tanks in the lead. Against five German battalions, including two SS battalions that XXX Corps intelligence had failed to detect, the spearhead Guards Armoured Division made steady progress. The woods and marshy ground along the highway limited the attack to a front not much wider than the width of the highway leading to Eindhoven. As night came, the British stopped in Valkenswaard, their "formal" objective. Eindhoven remained six miles to the north.
The 506th Parachute Infantry fought through ineffective delaying actions by small enemy groups and pressed the advance on Eindhoven early on D plus 1, 18 September. By midmorning, the lead battalion knocked out a nest of two 88-mm guns and pushed deep into the heart of the city. Col. Sink expected to find at least a regiment of Germans in Eindhoven; he actually encountered no more than a company. Having taken four bridges over the Dommel River and a canal in the city by noon, the paratroopers spent the rest of the day rounding up enemy stragglers and clearing the southern outskirts in preparation of the Guards Armoured Division. As they performed these tasks, Eindhoven went on a binge. As if by magic the city blossomed with the national color. "The reception was terrific," said one American officer. "The air seemed to reek with hate for the Germans . . . ."
Goaded by radio messages from Lt. Col. Cole to secure the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal, Capt. Jones organized a reinforced patrol. Lt. Edward L. Wierzbowski took his rifle platoon, the attached engineer platoon, and attached light machine gun section to the bridges. Lieutenant Wierzbowski found in turn that casualties and disorganization had left him with only eighteen riflemen and twenty-six engineers. Lt. Wierzbowski’s reinforced patrol was picking its way through the Zonsche Forest toward the bridges when night came with a cold, penetrating rain.
Based on stiff resistance north of Best encountered by H Company, Col. Michaelis directed Lt. Col. Robert G. Cole to take his 3rd Battalion to Captain Jones's assistance. The remainder of 3rd Battalion started toward Best at 1800, but darkness fell before they could establish physical contact with Captain Jones.
In the meantime, Lieutenant Wierzbowski and his men had crawled the last few yards on their bellies to reach the Wilhelmina Canal several hundred yards east of the highway bridge. Slithering along the dike, the men approached the bridge, apparently undetected. While the lieutenant and a scout crawled ahead to reconnoiter, the main body of the patrol slid down the embankment to await their return. A barrage of "potato masher" hand grenades came suddenly from the darkness on the other side of the
canal. Scared, a couple of men scrambled up the bank of the dike. Others followed. The night erupted with the fire of machine guns and rifles. Some of the men stampeded back toward the forest.
When he heard the firing, Lt. Wierzbowski was within sight of the bridge and found it covered by German sentries. Scurrying back, he discovered he only had 3 officers and 15 men remaining, and 3 of these were wounded. Collectively they had their individual weapons, a machine gun with 500 rounds of ammunition, a mortar with 6 rounds, and a bazooka with 5 rockets. As the cold rain fell, the men dug in for the night.
As these events developed, the 101st Airborne Division's D-Day glider lift began to arrive. Although not as immune to mishap as the parachutists, a total of 53 out of 70 gliders landed successfully with 32 jeeps, 13 trailers, and 252 men. Of those that failed to make it, 1 fell in the Channel, 1 crash-landed on the landing zone, 2 collided in the air above the landing zone, 2 were unaccounted for, 4 landed in friendly territory, and 7 came down behind enemy lines.
In Zon, the 506th PIR failed to secure the highway bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal before the Germans demolished the bridge. Destruction of the bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal in Zon increased the importance of the 502nd PIR’s mission of securing alternate bridges in Best.
On early D plus 1, 18 September, Col. Michaelis committed 2nd Battalion to the Best fight. The fight for the bridges near Best developed into the 101st Airborne Division's stiffest fighting on D plus 1 and 2.
Behind an artillery barrage that began an hour after the first troop carrier aircraft passed over the British lines, the XXX Corps had attacked on schedule with tanks in the lead. Against five German battalions, including two SS battalions that XXX Corps intelligence had failed to detect, the spearhead Guards Armoured Division made steady progress. The woods and marshy ground along the highway limited the attack to a front not much wider than the width of the highway leading to Eindhoven. As night came, the British stopped in Valkenswaard, their "formal" objective. Eindhoven remained six miles to the north.
The 506th Parachute Infantry fought through ineffective delaying actions by small enemy groups and pressed the advance on Eindhoven early on D plus 1, 18 September. By midmorning, the lead battalion knocked out a nest of two 88-mm guns and pushed deep into the heart of the city. Col. Sink expected to find at least a regiment of Germans in Eindhoven; he actually encountered no more than a company. Having taken four bridges over the Dommel River and a canal in the city by noon, the paratroopers spent the rest of the day rounding up enemy stragglers and clearing the southern outskirts in preparation of the Guards Armoured Division. As they performed these tasks, Eindhoven went on a binge. As if by magic the city blossomed with the national color. "The reception was terrific," said one American officer. "The air seemed to reek with hate for the Germans . . . ."
In the carnival atmosphere the paratroopers failed for a long time to hear the fretted clank of tanks. At 1130 the first direct radio communication with the Guards Armoured Division revealed that the armor was still five miles south of Eindhoven, engaged in a bitter fight. At 1230 hopes rose when two British armored cars appeared, but these had gone around the German flank to reach Eindhoven from the northwest. About 1900 the paratroopers spotted the head of the main British column.
The Guards Armoured Division pushed through Eindhoven without pause. When the column reached Zon, British engineers immediately began construction of a Bailey bridge to replace the destroyed bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal. At 0645 on D plus 2, 19 September, the armor rumbled across. Although the advance of XXX Corps proceeded swiftly it was at least thirty-three hours behind schedule.
General Poppe's 59th Division was the German unit defending Best. The First Parachute Army's General Student sent the bulk of the 59th Division to secure the bridges near Best. In the meantime, three companies reinforced by two replacement battalions and a police battalion were sent to cut Hell's Highway at St. Oedenrode.
The 2nd Battalion, 502nd PIR tried to push to the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal but had to fall back to a defense with Col. Cole's battalion on the edge of the Zonsche Forest. A timely strike by a flight of P-47s held the Germans back. During this action, a German sniper killed Lt. Col. Cole as he hastened from his covered position to direct the emplacement of identification panels for the P-47s which initially strafed 3d Battalion’s positions.
All through the day of D plus 1 the sound of firing had fanned hope of relief in the minds of Lieutenant Wierzbowski and his group of fifteen men along the dike near the highway bridge. Then, at 1100, the hundred-foot concrete span over the Wilhelmina Canal trembled and lifted with a violent explosion. The objective for which the 502nd Parachute Infantry continued to fight the rest of the day was no longer of value.
The experiences of Lieutenant Wierzbowski and his little group were a testimonial to the kind of hardship small, isolated units sometimes are called upon to endure. In midafternoon their troubles increased when a small German force attacked. Two German bullets hit the platoon's lead scout, Pfc. Joe E. Mann, who already had incurred two wounds; now both his arms hung useless. Though an engineer lieutenant and a sergeant tried to break through for aid, the lieutenant was captured and the sergeant wounded.
Hope stirred again during the late afternoon and early evening. First, a British armored car and a reconnaissance car appeared on the opposite bank of the canal. The British tried to raise headquarters of the 101st Airborne Division on their radio, but to no avail. They provided fire support until later in the evening when a platoon of paratroopers who had gotten lost stumbled onto Lieutenant Wierzbowski's position. Although this platoon agreed to defend one of Lieutenant Wierzbowski's flanks, the men fell back during the night in the face of a small German attack. Again Wierzbowski and his little group were alone. Lt. Wierzbowski sent word of his situation back with a small patrol from 2nd Battalion that stumbled into his position. Though the lieutenant sent word of his plight with this patrol, the report did not reach Lt. Col. Chappuis until the next morning. Distorted in transmission, the message said only that the bridge had been blown.
As a misty daylight began to break on D Plus 2, 19 September, Lieutenant Wierzbowski spotted a small German force bearing down on his position. Though the lieutenant yelled an alarm, the Germans already were too close. Two German grenades rolled down among the wounded. Although the men tossed these out before they exploded, another hit the machine gun and blinded the gunner. A moment later another grenade rolled into this man's foxhole. One eye blown out entirely, the other blinded, the soldier groped wildly for the grenade. He found it and tossed it from his foxhole only a split second before it exploded. Another grenade fell behind Private Mann, who was sitting in a trench with six other wounded. Mann saw the grenade come and felt it land behind him. Helpless, his arms bound and useless from the wounds incurred the day before, he yelled: "Grenade!" Then he lay back to take the explosion with his body.
"Shall we surrender or fight?" the men had asked persistently. As the Germans made a final charge, Lieutenant Wierzbowski gave them a succinct answer: "OK. This is the time." Only three of his men had gone unscathed. They had exhausted their supply of ammunition and grenades. One man put a dirty handkerchief on a rifle and waved it.
In the meantime, a stalemate had developed in the fighting along the edge of the Zonsche Forest. Though 2nd and 3nd and Battalions held their own, Col. Michaelis, could not reinforce them without neglecting defense of St. Oedenrode, which was one of his primary missions.
The solution came at last in the juncture with the British ground troops, whereby a squadron of British tanks and a modicum of artillery support became available. Arrival by glider in the afternoon of D plus 1 of two battalions of the 327th Glider Infantry under Col. Joseph H. Harper also helped. Because of rain and mist along the southern air route, this glider lift had come in via the northern route and brought successful landing of 428 out of 450 gliders of the 101st Airborne Division. A total of 2,579 men, 146 jeeps, 109 trailers, 2 bulldozers, and some resupply had arrived.
General Taylor ordered his assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, to take over-all command of the two battalions of the 502nd Parachute Infantry near Best, contingents of the 327th Glider Infantry, a squadron of British tanks, and elements of British artillery and to reduce all enemy east of the highway between Eindhoven and Hertogenbosch and north of the Wilhelmina Canal. Though the destruction of the Best highway bridge had eliminated the original purpose of the Best fighting, the job of protecting the west flank of the 101st Airborne Division remained.
The British tanks made the difference in an attack that began at 1400 on D plus 2. Within German ranks, a festering disintegration by late afternoon became a rout. "Send us all the MP's available," became the cry as hundreds of Germans began to surrender. For almost three days a bitter, costly, and frustrating fight, the action at Best was now little more than a mop-up. By the end of D plus 2 the prisoners totaled more than 1,400 with more than 300 enemy dead. Some of the prisoners came in with Lieutenant Vierzbowski and the survivors of his little band. They had been taken to a German aid station and there had talked their captors into surrender.
Best itself remained in German hands, and much of the territory taken was abandoned as soon as the mop-up ended. Now the battle of Hell's Highway was developing into the Indian-type fighting General Taylor later was to call it, and these men from Best were needed at other points. The engagement near Best had been costly and had secured neither of the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal, yet it had destroyed the 59th Division which could have affected the security of Hell’s Highway if left intact.
While the fight raged at Best on D plus 1 and 2, the rest of the 101st Airborne Division maintained defensive positions at Eindhoven, Zon, St. Oedenrode, and Veghel. From Eindhoven, Col. Sink's 506th Parachute Infantry sent a battalion to both flanks to widen the base of the MARKET-GARDEN corridor, but in both cases Sink recalled the troops before they reached their objectives. On the west the battalion returned because the XII British Corps had begun to advance along the left flank of the corridor and was expected soon to overrun the battalion's objective. The battalion on the east returned because Col. Sink learned that a column of German armor was loose in the region and he wanted no part of a meeting engagement with armor. Late in the afternoon of D Plus 2, the 107th Panzer Brigade struck toward Zon in an attempt to sever the thin lifeline over which the British ground column was pushing toward Nijmegen. Even without the 59th Division, the German attack came close to succeeding. Only a scratch force that included General Taylor's headquarters troops was available at the time for defending the Bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon. Darkness had fallen, a British truck struck by a round from a German tank was burning brightly atop the bridge, and a German Panther tank pumped round after round into the building which housed the division command post when General Taylor himself arrived with reinforcements. He led part of a glider infantry battalion and a lone 57-mm antitank gun. One of the first rounds from the 57-mm knocked out a German tank near the bridge. Bazooka fire disabled another. The Germans appeared to lose heart after losing two tanks and withdrew. Traffic gradually began to flow again along Hell's Highway.
Another German blow against Hell's Highway on D plus 2 came from the air, perhaps as a direct result of Hitler's exhortations that the Luftwaffe put his little world right again. About a hundred German twin-engine bombers came out of hiding after nightfall to bombard the central part of Eindhoven. Because most American units held positions outside the city, they incurred no damage; but more than a thousand civilians were killed or wounded, and British units were heavily hit. Whether from lack of planes, fuel, or trained crewmen, or because of all three, this was the only major strike by long-range German bombers during the course of the campaign in the West during the fall of 1944.
Lt. Col. Cassidy's 1st Battalion, 502nd PIR held their position about the canal and river bridges against persistent but small German attacks, most of which were in company strength. The strongest—by three companies of the 59th Division reinforced by police and replacement units—struck 1st Battalion on D plus 2 on the road to Schijndel. Hard pressed at first, Lt. Col. Cassidy's men gained assistance from Sgt. James M. “Paddy” McCrory, commander of a crippled tank that had dropped out of the British ground column. Although the tank could make no more than five miles per hour, McCrory plunged unhesitatingly into the fight. When the paratroopers tried to thank him, he brushed them off. "When in doubt," Sergeant McCrory said, "lash out." His words became a kind of unofficial motto of the battalion.
General Taylor had hoped to be in a stronger position by the end of D plus 2 with the addition of most of his airborne artillery. The flights on D plus 2 were postponed until late in the day on the chance the weather might clear. Troops in the gliders spoke of a mist so thick they could see nothing but three feet of tow rope stretching out into nowhere from their gliders. Because the glider pilots could not detect when their mother planes banked, many gliders turned over and had to cut loose prematurely. The Air/Sea Rescue Service worked overtime plucking ditched crewmen and passengers from the Channel. Many planes and gliders turned back. On the other hand, weather at German bases must have been better; for the Germans sent up more than 125 Messerschmitts and Focke-Wulfs. A total of 1,086 Allied troop carrier, tow, and resupply planes and 428 gliders took off on D plus 2. A large part of these returned to base, while 45 planes and 73 gliders were lost.
Because the 101st Airborne Division's landing zone was relatively secure, General Brereton allotted General Taylor, at the expense of the 82nd Airborne Division, 384 gliders for the D plus 2 flight, more than twice the number originally planned. Only 212 of these arrived. After missing the landing zone and circling vainly, 82 tow planes returned to England. Of these planes 31 of their gliders cut loose behind friendly lines, 16 were known to have crash-landed in enemy territory, and 26 were not accounted for. Those glidermen who landed behind German lines and eventually rejoined their units brought with them harrowing tales of hairbreadth escapes punctuated with praise for the Dutch underground. Most of these men were artillerymen, for the flights bringing in the artillery units were particularly cut up. Of 66 artillery pieces and antitank guns that started the flight, only 36 arrived. None was larger than the 75-mm pack howitzer; all planes towing gliders with 105-mm howitzers had to turn back.
Difficulties imposed on the 101st Airborne Division by the adverse weather could not be ignored, and General Taylor's "Indian War" to keep open Hell's Highway was critical as long as men and supplies had to go north over the highway. Nevertheless, at the moment, a situation had developed farther north that overshadowed events along Hell's Highway. Moving on Grave and Nijmegen, the British ground column was hard pressed to cross the Maas and Waal Rivers and reach the British airborne troops at Arnhem. To ensure passage of the ground column, the 82nd Airborne Division at Nijmegen was fighting against time.
For all the adversities north of the Neder Rijn, hope still existed as daylight came on D plus 5, 22 September, that the 43rd Infantry Division might break through at Ressen, relieve the British paratroopers, and bring over-all success to Operation MARKET-GARDEN. The XXX Corps commander, General Horrocks, ordered the division "to take all risks to effect relief today."
Yet, almost coincident with this hope, another major threat to the success of the operation was developing to the south in the sector of General Taylor's 101st Airborne Division. Despite an aggressive defense designed to prevent the enemy from concentrating at any one crucial spot to cut Hell's Highway, General Taylor on 22 September faced report after report from Dutch sources of large-scale German movements against the narrow corridor from both east and west.
The 101st Airborne Division commander, General Taylor, had recognized since late on D plus 2, 19 September, when his command post and the Bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon had almost fallen to the first strike of the 107th Panzer Brigade, that his division had entered a second and more difficult phase of the fighting. The point was underscored in the morning mist of D plus 3, 20 September, when the 107th Panzer Brigade struck again at the Zon bridge. Though a reinforced battalion of infantry was positioned to protect the bridge, German tank guns soon controlled the bridge by fire. The bridge might have fallen to the Germans had not ten British tanks belatedly responded to an SOS dating from the crisis of the night before. Knocking out four German tanks, the British forced the enemy back.
Recognizing that he had not the strength to maintain a static defense along the 15-mile length of Hell's Highway, General Taylor on D plus 3 chose to conduct limited offensive operations to keep the Germans off balance.
On D plus 4, 21 September, a reconnaissance by a company of Col. Michaelis' 502nd Parachute Infantry encountered stiff resistance near the village of Schijndel, four and one half miles northwest of St. Oedenrode. This coincided with civilian reports that the Germans were concentrating south of Schijndel for a counterattack upon St. Oedenrode. Col. Michaelis and the commander of the 501st Parachute Infantry, Col. Johnson, decided to press the Germans near Schijndel between them. Two battalions of Johnson's regiment would take Schijndel from the north. Thereupon two of Michaelis' battalions would attack northward against the German force that was south of the village.
In a swift move after dark on D plus 4, Col. Johnson took Schijndel not long after midnight on 21 September. Although a surprise counterattack against the village at dawn delayed the start of the second phase of the planned maneuver, Col. Michaelis' two battalions were able to begin their role by midmorning of D plus 5 on 22 September. Progressing smoothly, the attack gave promise of bountiful success. Then, abruptly, at 1430, an urgent message from General Taylor forced a halt.
General Taylor had learned that the Germans were concentrating for a major blow to sever Hell's Highway in the vicinity of Veghel and Uden. The maneuver near Schijndel during the morning of 22 September was occupying the bulk of Col. Johnson's 501st Parachute Infantry, but one battalion of that regiment still was in defensive positions in Veghel. Yet not a man was in Uden, the other place which the Americans believed the Germans would strike. General Taylor shifted his efforts to controlling Uden.
The Battalion Jungwirth joined the fight to cut Hell’s Highway and moved down a secondary road and by nightfall approached the hamlet of Koevering, located astride Hell's Highway a little more than a third of the distance from St. Oedenrode to Veghel and heretofore unoccupied by the Americans. Upon receiving reports of this enemy movement, the commander of 1st Battalion, 502nd Parachute Infantry at St. Oedenrode sent two companies racing toward Koevering. Arriving minutes ahead of the Germans, these companies denied the village; but they could not prevent Battalion Jungwirth from cutting Hell's Highway a few hundred yards to the northeast.
Through the night airborne and British artillery pounded the point of German penetration in an attempt to prevent reinforcement. The 907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion in firing positions only 400 yards from the Germans laid the guns of one battery for direct fire, operated the others with skeleton crews, and put the rest of the artillerymen in foxholes as riflemen. Yet the commander of the 6th Parachute Regiment, still managed to redeploy a portion of his forces to the point of penetration.
Marching during the night from Uden in a heavy rain, Col. Sink's 506th Parachute Infantry attacked at 0830 the next morning (D plus 8, 25 September) to squeeze the Germans from the northeast. A regiment of the 50th British Infantry Division and a reinforced battalion of the 502d Parachute Infantry pressed at the same time from the direction of St. Oedenrode. As the day wore on, Battalion Jungwirth and reinforcements from the 6th Parachute Regiment held firm. By nightfall the Allies had drawn a noose about the Germans on three sides, but a small segment of Hell's Highway still was in German hands.
During the night Battalion Jungwirth withdrew in apparent recognition of the tenuous nature of the position. The Germans nevertheless had held the penetration long enough to mine the highway extensively. Not until well into the day of D plus 9, 26 September, did engineers finally clear the road and open Hell's Highway again to traffic.
The elimination of this break near Koevering marked the stabilization of the 101st Airborne Division's front. Although the Germans struck time after time in varying strength at various positions along the road, never again were they able to cut it. Actually, General Reinhard's LXXXVIII Corps to the west of the highway concentrated primarily upon interfering with Allied movements through artillery fire, and General von Obstfelder's LXXXVI Corps to the east was too concerned with advance of the VIII British Corps to pay much more attention to Hell's Highway. By nightfall of 25 September patrols of the VIII Corps had contacted contingents of the XXX Corps at St. Antonis, south of Nijmegen, thereby presaging quick formation of a solid line along the east flank of the corridor. Both General Taylor's 101st Airborne Division and General Gavin's 82d Airborne Division would defend in place while the British tried to make the best of what had been happening at Arnhem.
Before the two U.S. divisions jumped in Operation MARKET, General Eisenhower had approved their participation with the stipulation that they be released as soon as ground forces could pass the positions they had seized and occupied. This had led to an expectation that at least one of the divisions might be released as early as forty-eight hours after the jump. Nevertheless, when the British Red Devils withdrew from north of the Neder Rijn to signal the end of the airborne phase, both American divisions still were in the line.
By 9 October, the British had widened the waist of the corridor to about twenty-four miles. Thereupon, the 12 Corps assumed responsibility for the "island" between the Waal and the Neder Rijn in order to free the XXX Corps for a projected drive against the Ruhr. Field Marshal Montgomery intended to strike southeast from Nijmegen in order to clear the west bank of the Rhine and the western face of the Ruhr and converge with a renewal of First Army's push against Cologne.
Even as October drew to an end and enemy pressure against the MARKET-GARDEN salient diminished, no release came for the two U.S. divisions. Like the 101st Airborne Division, part of General Gavin's 82nd moved northward onto the "island." Here the men huddled in shallow foxholes dug no more than three feet deep lest they fill with water seepage. In an attempt to deceive the Germans into believing the Allies planned another thrust northward, patrol after patrol probed the enemy lines.
On 2 October, General Eisenhower reminded Field Marshal Montgomery of the conditions under which use of the U.S. divisions had been granted and pointed out that the maintenance of the divisions had been based on that plan and that he contemplated using the two divisions about the middle of November. "To enable this to be done," he said "at least one of these divisions should be released without delay, and the second one within a reasonably short time thereafter."
Despite the letter of 2 October urging quick release of the American airborne divisions, General Eisenhower was not unsympathetic to the British manpower problem. He knew that British Empire troops available in the United Kingdom had long since been absorbed and that only in reinforcement from the Mediterranean Theater, a long-range project, did the British have a hope of strengthening themselves. Even after Montgomery decided in early October that his commitments were too great and enemy strength too imposing to permit an immediate drive on the Ruhr, General Eisenhower did not press the issue of the airborne divisions. Though relieved temporarily of the Ruhr offensive, the British had to attack westward to help the Canadians open Antwerp. General Eisenhower had not underestimated the desirability of relieving the airborne troops; rather, he saw from his vantage point as Supreme Commander the more critical need of the 21st Army Group. At a conference with his top commanders on 18 October in Brussels, he gave tacit approval to the continued employment of the two U.S. divisions. They were to be released, he said, when the Second Army completed its part in clearing the approaches to Antwerp.
The ordeal did not end for the 101st Airborne Division until 25 November 1944. After 69 days since their parachute landing near Zon, the first troops of General Taylor's division began to withdraw. Two days later, on 27 November, D plus 71, the last American paratroopers pulled off the dreaded "Island" north of the Waal. Once relieved, the Paratroopers of the 101st moved by truck along the same route they fought for so staunchly. In Nijmegen, Grave, Veghel, St. Oedenrode, Zon, and Eindhoven, the newly
liberated Dutch people roared "September 17!" as the Paratroopers passed.
During the two phases of MARKET-GARDEN the 101st Airborne Division sustained significant casualties. In the airborne phase, from 17 to 26 September the 101st Airborne Division lost 2,110 men killed, wounded, and missing. In the defensive phase, from 27 September to 27 November, the Division lost 1,682 men.
The Guards Armoured Division pushed through Eindhoven without pause. When the column reached Zon, British engineers immediately began construction of a Bailey bridge to replace the destroyed bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal. At 0645 on D plus 2, 19 September, the armor rumbled across. Although the advance of XXX Corps proceeded swiftly it was at least thirty-three hours behind schedule.
General Poppe's 59th Division was the German unit defending Best. The First Parachute Army's General Student sent the bulk of the 59th Division to secure the bridges near Best. In the meantime, three companies reinforced by two replacement battalions and a police battalion were sent to cut Hell's Highway at St. Oedenrode.
The 2nd Battalion, 502nd PIR tried to push to the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal but had to fall back to a defense with Col. Cole's battalion on the edge of the Zonsche Forest. A timely strike by a flight of P-47s held the Germans back. During this action, a German sniper killed Lt. Col. Cole as he hastened from his covered position to direct the emplacement of identification panels for the P-47s which initially strafed 3d Battalion’s positions.
All through the day of D plus 1 the sound of firing had fanned hope of relief in the minds of Lieutenant Wierzbowski and his group of fifteen men along the dike near the highway bridge. Then, at 1100, the hundred-foot concrete span over the Wilhelmina Canal trembled and lifted with a violent explosion. The objective for which the 502nd Parachute Infantry continued to fight the rest of the day was no longer of value.
The experiences of Lieutenant Wierzbowski and his little group were a testimonial to the kind of hardship small, isolated units sometimes are called upon to endure. In midafternoon their troubles increased when a small German force attacked. Two German bullets hit the platoon's lead scout, Pfc. Joe E. Mann, who already had incurred two wounds; now both his arms hung useless. Though an engineer lieutenant and a sergeant tried to break through for aid, the lieutenant was captured and the sergeant wounded.
Hope stirred again during the late afternoon and early evening. First, a British armored car and a reconnaissance car appeared on the opposite bank of the canal. The British tried to raise headquarters of the 101st Airborne Division on their radio, but to no avail. They provided fire support until later in the evening when a platoon of paratroopers who had gotten lost stumbled onto Lieutenant Wierzbowski's position. Although this platoon agreed to defend one of Lieutenant Wierzbowski's flanks, the men fell back during the night in the face of a small German attack. Again Wierzbowski and his little group were alone. Lt. Wierzbowski sent word of his situation back with a small patrol from 2nd Battalion that stumbled into his position. Though the lieutenant sent word of his plight with this patrol, the report did not reach Lt. Col. Chappuis until the next morning. Distorted in transmission, the message said only that the bridge had been blown.
As a misty daylight began to break on D Plus 2, 19 September, Lieutenant Wierzbowski spotted a small German force bearing down on his position. Though the lieutenant yelled an alarm, the Germans already were too close. Two German grenades rolled down among the wounded. Although the men tossed these out before they exploded, another hit the machine gun and blinded the gunner. A moment later another grenade rolled into this man's foxhole. One eye blown out entirely, the other blinded, the soldier groped wildly for the grenade. He found it and tossed it from his foxhole only a split second before it exploded. Another grenade fell behind Private Mann, who was sitting in a trench with six other wounded. Mann saw the grenade come and felt it land behind him. Helpless, his arms bound and useless from the wounds incurred the day before, he yelled: "Grenade!" Then he lay back to take the explosion with his body.
"Shall we surrender or fight?" the men had asked persistently. As the Germans made a final charge, Lieutenant Wierzbowski gave them a succinct answer: "OK. This is the time." Only three of his men had gone unscathed. They had exhausted their supply of ammunition and grenades. One man put a dirty handkerchief on a rifle and waved it.
In the meantime, a stalemate had developed in the fighting along the edge of the Zonsche Forest. Though 2nd and 3nd and Battalions held their own, Col. Michaelis, could not reinforce them without neglecting defense of St. Oedenrode, which was one of his primary missions.
The solution came at last in the juncture with the British ground troops, whereby a squadron of British tanks and a modicum of artillery support became available. Arrival by glider in the afternoon of D plus 1 of two battalions of the 327th Glider Infantry under Col. Joseph H. Harper also helped. Because of rain and mist along the southern air route, this glider lift had come in via the northern route and brought successful landing of 428 out of 450 gliders of the 101st Airborne Division. A total of 2,579 men, 146 jeeps, 109 trailers, 2 bulldozers, and some resupply had arrived.
General Taylor ordered his assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, to take over-all command of the two battalions of the 502nd Parachute Infantry near Best, contingents of the 327th Glider Infantry, a squadron of British tanks, and elements of British artillery and to reduce all enemy east of the highway between Eindhoven and Hertogenbosch and north of the Wilhelmina Canal. Though the destruction of the Best highway bridge had eliminated the original purpose of the Best fighting, the job of protecting the west flank of the 101st Airborne Division remained.
The British tanks made the difference in an attack that began at 1400 on D plus 2. Within German ranks, a festering disintegration by late afternoon became a rout. "Send us all the MP's available," became the cry as hundreds of Germans began to surrender. For almost three days a bitter, costly, and frustrating fight, the action at Best was now little more than a mop-up. By the end of D plus 2 the prisoners totaled more than 1,400 with more than 300 enemy dead. Some of the prisoners came in with Lieutenant Vierzbowski and the survivors of his little band. They had been taken to a German aid station and there had talked their captors into surrender.
Best itself remained in German hands, and much of the territory taken was abandoned as soon as the mop-up ended. Now the battle of Hell's Highway was developing into the Indian-type fighting General Taylor later was to call it, and these men from Best were needed at other points. The engagement near Best had been costly and had secured neither of the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal, yet it had destroyed the 59th Division which could have affected the security of Hell’s Highway if left intact.
While the fight raged at Best on D plus 1 and 2, the rest of the 101st Airborne Division maintained defensive positions at Eindhoven, Zon, St. Oedenrode, and Veghel. From Eindhoven, Col. Sink's 506th Parachute Infantry sent a battalion to both flanks to widen the base of the MARKET-GARDEN corridor, but in both cases Sink recalled the troops before they reached their objectives. On the west the battalion returned because the XII British Corps had begun to advance along the left flank of the corridor and was expected soon to overrun the battalion's objective. The battalion on the east returned because Col. Sink learned that a column of German armor was loose in the region and he wanted no part of a meeting engagement with armor. Late in the afternoon of D Plus 2, the 107th Panzer Brigade struck toward Zon in an attempt to sever the thin lifeline over which the British ground column was pushing toward Nijmegen. Even without the 59th Division, the German attack came close to succeeding. Only a scratch force that included General Taylor's headquarters troops was available at the time for defending the Bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon. Darkness had fallen, a British truck struck by a round from a German tank was burning brightly atop the bridge, and a German Panther tank pumped round after round into the building which housed the division command post when General Taylor himself arrived with reinforcements. He led part of a glider infantry battalion and a lone 57-mm antitank gun. One of the first rounds from the 57-mm knocked out a German tank near the bridge. Bazooka fire disabled another. The Germans appeared to lose heart after losing two tanks and withdrew. Traffic gradually began to flow again along Hell's Highway.
Another German blow against Hell's Highway on D plus 2 came from the air, perhaps as a direct result of Hitler's exhortations that the Luftwaffe put his little world right again. About a hundred German twin-engine bombers came out of hiding after nightfall to bombard the central part of Eindhoven. Because most American units held positions outside the city, they incurred no damage; but more than a thousand civilians were killed or wounded, and British units were heavily hit. Whether from lack of planes, fuel, or trained crewmen, or because of all three, this was the only major strike by long-range German bombers during the course of the campaign in the West during the fall of 1944.
Lt. Col. Cassidy's 1st Battalion, 502nd PIR held their position about the canal and river bridges against persistent but small German attacks, most of which were in company strength. The strongest—by three companies of the 59th Division reinforced by police and replacement units—struck 1st Battalion on D plus 2 on the road to Schijndel. Hard pressed at first, Lt. Col. Cassidy's men gained assistance from Sgt. James M. “Paddy” McCrory, commander of a crippled tank that had dropped out of the British ground column. Although the tank could make no more than five miles per hour, McCrory plunged unhesitatingly into the fight. When the paratroopers tried to thank him, he brushed them off. "When in doubt," Sergeant McCrory said, "lash out." His words became a kind of unofficial motto of the battalion.
General Taylor had hoped to be in a stronger position by the end of D plus 2 with the addition of most of his airborne artillery. The flights on D plus 2 were postponed until late in the day on the chance the weather might clear. Troops in the gliders spoke of a mist so thick they could see nothing but three feet of tow rope stretching out into nowhere from their gliders. Because the glider pilots could not detect when their mother planes banked, many gliders turned over and had to cut loose prematurely. The Air/Sea Rescue Service worked overtime plucking ditched crewmen and passengers from the Channel. Many planes and gliders turned back. On the other hand, weather at German bases must have been better; for the Germans sent up more than 125 Messerschmitts and Focke-Wulfs. A total of 1,086 Allied troop carrier, tow, and resupply planes and 428 gliders took off on D plus 2. A large part of these returned to base, while 45 planes and 73 gliders were lost.
Because the 101st Airborne Division's landing zone was relatively secure, General Brereton allotted General Taylor, at the expense of the 82nd Airborne Division, 384 gliders for the D plus 2 flight, more than twice the number originally planned. Only 212 of these arrived. After missing the landing zone and circling vainly, 82 tow planes returned to England. Of these planes 31 of their gliders cut loose behind friendly lines, 16 were known to have crash-landed in enemy territory, and 26 were not accounted for. Those glidermen who landed behind German lines and eventually rejoined their units brought with them harrowing tales of hairbreadth escapes punctuated with praise for the Dutch underground. Most of these men were artillerymen, for the flights bringing in the artillery units were particularly cut up. Of 66 artillery pieces and antitank guns that started the flight, only 36 arrived. None was larger than the 75-mm pack howitzer; all planes towing gliders with 105-mm howitzers had to turn back.
Difficulties imposed on the 101st Airborne Division by the adverse weather could not be ignored, and General Taylor's "Indian War" to keep open Hell's Highway was critical as long as men and supplies had to go north over the highway. Nevertheless, at the moment, a situation had developed farther north that overshadowed events along Hell's Highway. Moving on Grave and Nijmegen, the British ground column was hard pressed to cross the Maas and Waal Rivers and reach the British airborne troops at Arnhem. To ensure passage of the ground column, the 82nd Airborne Division at Nijmegen was fighting against time.
For all the adversities north of the Neder Rijn, hope still existed as daylight came on D plus 5, 22 September, that the 43rd Infantry Division might break through at Ressen, relieve the British paratroopers, and bring over-all success to Operation MARKET-GARDEN. The XXX Corps commander, General Horrocks, ordered the division "to take all risks to effect relief today."
Yet, almost coincident with this hope, another major threat to the success of the operation was developing to the south in the sector of General Taylor's 101st Airborne Division. Despite an aggressive defense designed to prevent the enemy from concentrating at any one crucial spot to cut Hell's Highway, General Taylor on 22 September faced report after report from Dutch sources of large-scale German movements against the narrow corridor from both east and west.
The 101st Airborne Division commander, General Taylor, had recognized since late on D plus 2, 19 September, when his command post and the Bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon had almost fallen to the first strike of the 107th Panzer Brigade, that his division had entered a second and more difficult phase of the fighting. The point was underscored in the morning mist of D plus 3, 20 September, when the 107th Panzer Brigade struck again at the Zon bridge. Though a reinforced battalion of infantry was positioned to protect the bridge, German tank guns soon controlled the bridge by fire. The bridge might have fallen to the Germans had not ten British tanks belatedly responded to an SOS dating from the crisis of the night before. Knocking out four German tanks, the British forced the enemy back.
Recognizing that he had not the strength to maintain a static defense along the 15-mile length of Hell's Highway, General Taylor on D plus 3 chose to conduct limited offensive operations to keep the Germans off balance.
On D plus 4, 21 September, a reconnaissance by a company of Col. Michaelis' 502nd Parachute Infantry encountered stiff resistance near the village of Schijndel, four and one half miles northwest of St. Oedenrode. This coincided with civilian reports that the Germans were concentrating south of Schijndel for a counterattack upon St. Oedenrode. Col. Michaelis and the commander of the 501st Parachute Infantry, Col. Johnson, decided to press the Germans near Schijndel between them. Two battalions of Johnson's regiment would take Schijndel from the north. Thereupon two of Michaelis' battalions would attack northward against the German force that was south of the village.
In a swift move after dark on D plus 4, Col. Johnson took Schijndel not long after midnight on 21 September. Although a surprise counterattack against the village at dawn delayed the start of the second phase of the planned maneuver, Col. Michaelis' two battalions were able to begin their role by midmorning of D plus 5 on 22 September. Progressing smoothly, the attack gave promise of bountiful success. Then, abruptly, at 1430, an urgent message from General Taylor forced a halt.
General Taylor had learned that the Germans were concentrating for a major blow to sever Hell's Highway in the vicinity of Veghel and Uden. The maneuver near Schijndel during the morning of 22 September was occupying the bulk of Col. Johnson's 501st Parachute Infantry, but one battalion of that regiment still was in defensive positions in Veghel. Yet not a man was in Uden, the other place which the Americans believed the Germans would strike. General Taylor shifted his efforts to controlling Uden.
The Battalion Jungwirth joined the fight to cut Hell’s Highway and moved down a secondary road and by nightfall approached the hamlet of Koevering, located astride Hell's Highway a little more than a third of the distance from St. Oedenrode to Veghel and heretofore unoccupied by the Americans. Upon receiving reports of this enemy movement, the commander of 1st Battalion, 502nd Parachute Infantry at St. Oedenrode sent two companies racing toward Koevering. Arriving minutes ahead of the Germans, these companies denied the village; but they could not prevent Battalion Jungwirth from cutting Hell's Highway a few hundred yards to the northeast.
Through the night airborne and British artillery pounded the point of German penetration in an attempt to prevent reinforcement. The 907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion in firing positions only 400 yards from the Germans laid the guns of one battery for direct fire, operated the others with skeleton crews, and put the rest of the artillerymen in foxholes as riflemen. Yet the commander of the 6th Parachute Regiment, still managed to redeploy a portion of his forces to the point of penetration.
Marching during the night from Uden in a heavy rain, Col. Sink's 506th Parachute Infantry attacked at 0830 the next morning (D plus 8, 25 September) to squeeze the Germans from the northeast. A regiment of the 50th British Infantry Division and a reinforced battalion of the 502d Parachute Infantry pressed at the same time from the direction of St. Oedenrode. As the day wore on, Battalion Jungwirth and reinforcements from the 6th Parachute Regiment held firm. By nightfall the Allies had drawn a noose about the Germans on three sides, but a small segment of Hell's Highway still was in German hands.
During the night Battalion Jungwirth withdrew in apparent recognition of the tenuous nature of the position. The Germans nevertheless had held the penetration long enough to mine the highway extensively. Not until well into the day of D plus 9, 26 September, did engineers finally clear the road and open Hell's Highway again to traffic.
The elimination of this break near Koevering marked the stabilization of the 101st Airborne Division's front. Although the Germans struck time after time in varying strength at various positions along the road, never again were they able to cut it. Actually, General Reinhard's LXXXVIII Corps to the west of the highway concentrated primarily upon interfering with Allied movements through artillery fire, and General von Obstfelder's LXXXVI Corps to the east was too concerned with advance of the VIII British Corps to pay much more attention to Hell's Highway. By nightfall of 25 September patrols of the VIII Corps had contacted contingents of the XXX Corps at St. Antonis, south of Nijmegen, thereby presaging quick formation of a solid line along the east flank of the corridor. Both General Taylor's 101st Airborne Division and General Gavin's 82d Airborne Division would defend in place while the British tried to make the best of what had been happening at Arnhem.
Before the two U.S. divisions jumped in Operation MARKET, General Eisenhower had approved their participation with the stipulation that they be released as soon as ground forces could pass the positions they had seized and occupied. This had led to an expectation that at least one of the divisions might be released as early as forty-eight hours after the jump. Nevertheless, when the British Red Devils withdrew from north of the Neder Rijn to signal the end of the airborne phase, both American divisions still were in the line.
By 9 October, the British had widened the waist of the corridor to about twenty-four miles. Thereupon, the 12 Corps assumed responsibility for the "island" between the Waal and the Neder Rijn in order to free the XXX Corps for a projected drive against the Ruhr. Field Marshal Montgomery intended to strike southeast from Nijmegen in order to clear the west bank of the Rhine and the western face of the Ruhr and converge with a renewal of First Army's push against Cologne.
Even as October drew to an end and enemy pressure against the MARKET-GARDEN salient diminished, no release came for the two U.S. divisions. Like the 101st Airborne Division, part of General Gavin's 82nd moved northward onto the "island." Here the men huddled in shallow foxholes dug no more than three feet deep lest they fill with water seepage. In an attempt to deceive the Germans into believing the Allies planned another thrust northward, patrol after patrol probed the enemy lines.
On 2 October, General Eisenhower reminded Field Marshal Montgomery of the conditions under which use of the U.S. divisions had been granted and pointed out that the maintenance of the divisions had been based on that plan and that he contemplated using the two divisions about the middle of November. "To enable this to be done," he said "at least one of these divisions should be released without delay, and the second one within a reasonably short time thereafter."
Despite the letter of 2 October urging quick release of the American airborne divisions, General Eisenhower was not unsympathetic to the British manpower problem. He knew that British Empire troops available in the United Kingdom had long since been absorbed and that only in reinforcement from the Mediterranean Theater, a long-range project, did the British have a hope of strengthening themselves. Even after Montgomery decided in early October that his commitments were too great and enemy strength too imposing to permit an immediate drive on the Ruhr, General Eisenhower did not press the issue of the airborne divisions. Though relieved temporarily of the Ruhr offensive, the British had to attack westward to help the Canadians open Antwerp. General Eisenhower had not underestimated the desirability of relieving the airborne troops; rather, he saw from his vantage point as Supreme Commander the more critical need of the 21st Army Group. At a conference with his top commanders on 18 October in Brussels, he gave tacit approval to the continued employment of the two U.S. divisions. They were to be released, he said, when the Second Army completed its part in clearing the approaches to Antwerp.
The ordeal did not end for the 101st Airborne Division until 25 November 1944. After 69 days since their parachute landing near Zon, the first troops of General Taylor's division began to withdraw. Two days later, on 27 November, D plus 71, the last American paratroopers pulled off the dreaded "Island" north of the Waal. Once relieved, the Paratroopers of the 101st moved by truck along the same route they fought for so staunchly. In Nijmegen, Grave, Veghel, St. Oedenrode, Zon, and Eindhoven, the newly
liberated Dutch people roared "September 17!" as the Paratroopers passed.
During the two phases of MARKET-GARDEN the 101st Airborne Division sustained significant casualties. In the airborne phase, from 17 to 26 September the 101st Airborne Division lost 2,110 men killed, wounded, and missing. In the defensive phase, from 27 September to 27 November, the Division lost 1,682 men.
The battle of the bulge
Bastogne
On December 16 1944 the Germans launched a massive coordinated offensive through the heavily wooded area of the Ardennes Forest with the intent for securing the port of Antwerp in order to cut off the allied supply line. The 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions were quickly moved from camps in France to shore up the American front line that was crumbling under the speed and mass of the German attack. All major roads and rail lined passed through the small Belgian city of Bastogne. The German capture of this important transportation hub would allow the Germans to quickly move forces west to Antwerp.
On 18 December 1944, the 101st Airborne Division moved from Camp Mourmelon, France to Bastogne driving through rain and snow flurries in the back of 2 ½ and 10 ton trucks. The later serials most of the 107-mile trip traveled in darkness throughout the night. All parts of the column were forced to buck the mass of vehicles streaming back to the west from the front. The move was made in good time with some elements taking only eight hours to reach Bastogne. By 0900 on 19 December, Brigade General McAuliffe, the acting division commander, had all four regiments of the 101st around Bastogne. Soon after arriving in Bastogne, the paratroopers of the 502nd began digging defensive positions along the north and northwest portion of the defensive perimeter surrounding the city
On December 16 1944 the Germans launched a massive coordinated offensive through the heavily wooded area of the Ardennes Forest with the intent for securing the port of Antwerp in order to cut off the allied supply line. The 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions were quickly moved from camps in France to shore up the American front line that was crumbling under the speed and mass of the German attack. All major roads and rail lined passed through the small Belgian city of Bastogne. The German capture of this important transportation hub would allow the Germans to quickly move forces west to Antwerp.
On 18 December 1944, the 101st Airborne Division moved from Camp Mourmelon, France to Bastogne driving through rain and snow flurries in the back of 2 ½ and 10 ton trucks. The later serials most of the 107-mile trip traveled in darkness throughout the night. All parts of the column were forced to buck the mass of vehicles streaming back to the west from the front. The move was made in good time with some elements taking only eight hours to reach Bastogne. By 0900 on 19 December, Brigade General McAuliffe, the acting division commander, had all four regiments of the 101st around Bastogne. Soon after arriving in Bastogne, the paratroopers of the 502nd began digging defensive positions along the north and northwest portion of the defensive perimeter surrounding the city
On 20 December 1944, German forces completely encircled the defenders of Bastogne. "It was on this day, 20 December," reads the war diary of the 327th Glider Infantry, "that all roads were cut by the enemy...we were completely surrounded.” The German siege of Bastogne cut off the supply convoys that were delivering supplies to the paratroopers. The 101st has to rely on other means of resupply; airdrops.
The airdrop scheduled for 22 December never reached Bastogne as bad flying weather prevented the resupply mission from reaching its destination. All that the Third Army air liaison staff could do was to send a message that "the 101st Airborne situation is known and appreciated." Artillery ammunition was running very low. The large number of wounded congregated inside Bastogne presented a special problem: there troops to wrap the men suffering from wounds and shock. Nonetheless, morale remained high. Late in the afternoon word circulated to all the regiments that the 4th Armored Division and the 7th Armored Division were on their way to Bastogne; to the men in the line this was heartening news. Even though only the 4th Armored Division was headed to Bastogne the rumors of both divisions approach improved morale among the men.
About noon on the 22 December four German Soldiers under a white flag entered the lines of the 2d Battalion, 327th GIR. The terms of the announcement they carried were simple: "the honorable surrender of the encircled town," this to be accomplished in two hours on threat of "annihilation" by the massed fires of the German artillery. The rest of the story has become legend: how Brigadier General McAuliffe disdainfully answered "Nuts!"; and how Colonel Harper, commander of the 327th, hard pressed to translate the idiom, compromised on "Go to Hell!" The ultimatum had been signed rather ambiguously by "The German Commander," and none of the German generals then in the Bastogne sector seem to have been anxious to claim authorship. Lt. Col. Paul A Danahy, G-2 of the 101st, saw to it that the story circulated-and appropriately embellished in the daily periodic report: "The Commanding General's answer was, with a sarcastic air of humorous tolerance, emphatically negative." Nonetheless the 101st expected that the next day would be rough.
The airdrop scheduled for 22 December never reached Bastogne as bad flying weather prevented the resupply mission from reaching its destination. All that the Third Army air liaison staff could do was to send a message that "the 101st Airborne situation is known and appreciated." Artillery ammunition was running very low. The large number of wounded congregated inside Bastogne presented a special problem: there troops to wrap the men suffering from wounds and shock. Nonetheless, morale remained high. Late in the afternoon word circulated to all the regiments that the 4th Armored Division and the 7th Armored Division were on their way to Bastogne; to the men in the line this was heartening news. Even though only the 4th Armored Division was headed to Bastogne the rumors of both divisions approach improved morale among the men.
About noon on the 22 December four German Soldiers under a white flag entered the lines of the 2d Battalion, 327th GIR. The terms of the announcement they carried were simple: "the honorable surrender of the encircled town," this to be accomplished in two hours on threat of "annihilation" by the massed fires of the German artillery. The rest of the story has become legend: how Brigadier General McAuliffe disdainfully answered "Nuts!"; and how Colonel Harper, commander of the 327th, hard pressed to translate the idiom, compromised on "Go to Hell!" The ultimatum had been signed rather ambiguously by "The German Commander," and none of the German generals then in the Bastogne sector seem to have been anxious to claim authorship. Lt. Col. Paul A Danahy, G-2 of the 101st, saw to it that the story circulated-and appropriately embellished in the daily periodic report: "The Commanding General's answer was, with a sarcastic air of humorous tolerance, emphatically negative." Nonetheless the 101st expected that the next day would be rough.
The weather on the morning of 23 December was cold but clear. "Visibility unlimited," the air-control posts happily reported all the way from the United Kingdom to the foxholes on the Ardennes front. To most of the American troops this was a red-letter day-long remembered. Bombers and fighter-bombers once more streaked overhead like shoals of silver minnows in the bright winter sun, their sharply etched contrails making a wake behind them in the cold air.
In Bastogne, however, all eyes looked for the squat planes of the Troop Carrier Command. About 0900 a Pathfinder team dropped inside the perimeter and set up the apparatus to guide the C-47's over a drop zone between Senonchamps and Bastogne. The first of the carriers dropped its six parapacks at 1150, and in little more than four hours 241 planes had been vectored to Bastogne. Each plane carried twelve hundred pounds of supplies, but not all the aircraft reached the drop zone nor did all the parapacks fall where troopers could recover them. Nevertheless, the day's drop lessened the pinch. On 24 December a total of 160 planes dropped supplies. Poor flying weather on Christmas Day virtually scrubbed all cargo missions, although eleven gliders did bring in a team of four surgeons and some fuel and oil badly needed for the tanks. The biggest airlift was on the 26th when 289 planes on flew the Bastogne supply run.
In Bastogne, however, all eyes looked for the squat planes of the Troop Carrier Command. About 0900 a Pathfinder team dropped inside the perimeter and set up the apparatus to guide the C-47's over a drop zone between Senonchamps and Bastogne. The first of the carriers dropped its six parapacks at 1150, and in little more than four hours 241 planes had been vectored to Bastogne. Each plane carried twelve hundred pounds of supplies, but not all the aircraft reached the drop zone nor did all the parapacks fall where troopers could recover them. Nevertheless, the day's drop lessened the pinch. On 24 December a total of 160 planes dropped supplies. Poor flying weather on Christmas Day virtually scrubbed all cargo missions, although eleven gliders did bring in a team of four surgeons and some fuel and oil badly needed for the tanks. The biggest airlift was on the 26th when 289 planes on flew the Bastogne supply run.
The airdrop on the 23 December brought a dividend for the troops defending Bastogne. The cargo planes were all escorted by fighters, their protective mission accomplished, turned to hammer the Germans in the Bastogne ring. During the day eighty-two P-47's lashed out at the enemy with bombs and machine gun fire. The 101st reported to that the "air and artillery is having a field day around Bastogne."
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About 0300 on Christmas morning, a several German planes droned over the Deuce’s position and dropped bombs indiscriminately around Rolle, the 502nd regimental command post. A few minutes later German gunners and mortar crews started firing on the American positions at Champs. Able Company was deployed on the northwest edge of the village, its right flank joining the 2d Battalion in a large wood lot midway between Champs and Longchamps. Clad in white snow suits some fifty grenadiers from the 77th Panzer Grenadier Regiment crept forward toward Champs under the low light of the waning moon. At 0400 the 77th dashed into the village of Champs. Soon, more German troops moved through the woods against the left flank of the 2d Battalion. Within the hour a full German battalion had joined the fight. Company B moved up to support A Company, but the confused melee around Champs in the predawn darkness pinned the Germans down.
Shortly after the initial attack, eighteen German Mark IV tanks and the riding grenadiers of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division had broken through positions held by Companies A and B of the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment before dawn and got as far as the battalion command post. Several of the enemy tanks passed straight through artillery battery positions in the rear of the 327th. Just west of Hemroulle about half the German tanks wheeled left, defiling along a cart path which led to the road between Champs and Bastogne.
As they approached the road the panzers formed in line abreast, now bearing straight toward Companies B and C of the 502nd, which were on the march to help the Able Company paratroopers in Champs.
Lt. Col. Chappuis had a few minutes to orient his companies toward the oncoming tanks, but two tank destroyers from Company B of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion absorbed the initial shock and were knocked out as they fell back toward the Champs road. As the panzers rolled forward, Company C made an orderly withdrawal to the edge of a large wood lot midway between Champs and Hemroulle. The Paratroopers showered the tanks with fire, and the German infantry clinging to the decks and sides fell to the snow. The tank detachment again wheeled into column, this time turning toward Champs. Two of the 705th tank destroyers, which were supporting Company C, caught the column in the process of turning and destroyed three of the panzers while the paratroopers destroyed two more with bazookas. John Ballard of Able Company accounted for one of the two German tanks destroyed by paratroopers in Champs.
The half of the enemy formation which had kept on toward Hemroulle after knifing through the 327th encountered the a furious cross fire laid down by four of the 705th tank destroyers, tanks, artillery, and bazookas handled by the men of the 327th GIR. As recounted by Col. S. L. A. Marshall after the battle: "The German tanks were fired at from so many directions and with such a mixture of fire that it was not possible to see or say how each tank met its doom." The survivors of those panzer grenadiers of the 1st Battalion who had ridden into battle on the tanks found themselves surrounded and alone, for the American rifle line had sealed itself after the initial armored punctures. About fifty German riflemen who had hidden in a stream bed were captured by artillerymen from the 755th.
A "relief column" heading for the Bastogne perimeter consisted of the three Sherman tanks commanded by Lieutenant Boggess, in the lead, followed by a half-track, and two more Shermans bringing up the rear. Lt. Boggess moved quickly, firing machine guns into the tree line. After a mine destroyed the half-track and the armor crews removed mines form the road, the column approached the American lines. On 26 December at 1650, Lt. Boggess saw engineers in friendly uniforms preparing to assault a pillbox near the highway. These were men from the 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion. Twenty minutes later Col. Abrams shook hands with Brigadier General McAuliffe, who had come to the outpost line to welcome the relieving force. The 4th Armored Division breach in the German encirclement of Bastogne was narrow and precarious, but it would remain open despite the most strenuous enemy efforts in following days.
On 3 January 1945, the 19th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the Hohenstauffen Division attacked 2d Bn north of Longchamps, Belgium which resulted in the capture of 40 Paratroopers, mostly for Fox Company. The following week’s fighting was bloody and intense along the railroad line running northeast through the Bois Jacques Forest. During this drive on 14 January 1945, Lt. Col. John Stopka was killed by friendly aircraft strafing a nearby target and Cecil Simmons became the third and final commander of 3d Bn. Despite the German resistance the 502nd captured their objective at Bourcy, Belgium.
Shortly after the initial attack, eighteen German Mark IV tanks and the riding grenadiers of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division had broken through positions held by Companies A and B of the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment before dawn and got as far as the battalion command post. Several of the enemy tanks passed straight through artillery battery positions in the rear of the 327th. Just west of Hemroulle about half the German tanks wheeled left, defiling along a cart path which led to the road between Champs and Bastogne.
As they approached the road the panzers formed in line abreast, now bearing straight toward Companies B and C of the 502nd, which were on the march to help the Able Company paratroopers in Champs.
Lt. Col. Chappuis had a few minutes to orient his companies toward the oncoming tanks, but two tank destroyers from Company B of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion absorbed the initial shock and were knocked out as they fell back toward the Champs road. As the panzers rolled forward, Company C made an orderly withdrawal to the edge of a large wood lot midway between Champs and Hemroulle. The Paratroopers showered the tanks with fire, and the German infantry clinging to the decks and sides fell to the snow. The tank detachment again wheeled into column, this time turning toward Champs. Two of the 705th tank destroyers, which were supporting Company C, caught the column in the process of turning and destroyed three of the panzers while the paratroopers destroyed two more with bazookas. John Ballard of Able Company accounted for one of the two German tanks destroyed by paratroopers in Champs.
The half of the enemy formation which had kept on toward Hemroulle after knifing through the 327th encountered the a furious cross fire laid down by four of the 705th tank destroyers, tanks, artillery, and bazookas handled by the men of the 327th GIR. As recounted by Col. S. L. A. Marshall after the battle: "The German tanks were fired at from so many directions and with such a mixture of fire that it was not possible to see or say how each tank met its doom." The survivors of those panzer grenadiers of the 1st Battalion who had ridden into battle on the tanks found themselves surrounded and alone, for the American rifle line had sealed itself after the initial armored punctures. About fifty German riflemen who had hidden in a stream bed were captured by artillerymen from the 755th.
A "relief column" heading for the Bastogne perimeter consisted of the three Sherman tanks commanded by Lieutenant Boggess, in the lead, followed by a half-track, and two more Shermans bringing up the rear. Lt. Boggess moved quickly, firing machine guns into the tree line. After a mine destroyed the half-track and the armor crews removed mines form the road, the column approached the American lines. On 26 December at 1650, Lt. Boggess saw engineers in friendly uniforms preparing to assault a pillbox near the highway. These were men from the 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion. Twenty minutes later Col. Abrams shook hands with Brigadier General McAuliffe, who had come to the outpost line to welcome the relieving force. The 4th Armored Division breach in the German encirclement of Bastogne was narrow and precarious, but it would remain open despite the most strenuous enemy efforts in following days.
On 3 January 1945, the 19th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the Hohenstauffen Division attacked 2d Bn north of Longchamps, Belgium which resulted in the capture of 40 Paratroopers, mostly for Fox Company. The following week’s fighting was bloody and intense along the railroad line running northeast through the Bois Jacques Forest. During this drive on 14 January 1945, Lt. Col. John Stopka was killed by friendly aircraft strafing a nearby target and Cecil Simmons became the third and final commander of 3d Bn. Despite the German resistance the 502nd captured their objective at Bourcy, Belgium.
End of the War
Beyond Bastogne
After Bastogne, the Deuce traveled to the 7th Army area in Alsace with the rest of the 101st Airborne in mid-January where they held a line along the Moder River for over a month. In February, the men of the Deuce climbed aboard rail cars to refit in Mourmelon le Petit, France. On March 15, 1945 General Eisenhower visited Mourmelon to present the 101st Division a Presidential Distinguished Unit Citation. This was the first Citation ever presented to an entire division and was in honor of the 101st defense of Bastogne and gallantry in action. The men of the 502nd saw action again in April 1945 when they took up position in vicinity of Dusseldorf, to help close the Ruhr Pocket along the Rhine River. In May, the paratroopers arrived at Berchtesgaden, Germany for a short time. The 502nd spent most of the summer of 1945 occupying Mittersill, Austria.
Left: General Eisenhower reviewing the troops of the 101st at Mourmelon
Members of the Deuce with high points sailed home in the summer of 1945, while others, awaiting discharge were absorbed into the Deuce in the interim. Returning to the Joigny-Auxerre area of France the Deuce made a final “pay jump” in September 1945. The regiment and the division were deactivated in December 1945. The unit would be resurrected with the 101st Airborne in 1956. |
Above left: General Taylor inspects the troops in Alsace. Above Right: Ike 101st Unit Citation at Mourmelon.